The Union of the Intellect and the Intelligible from a New Perspective

Reza Akbari

 

Metaphysics abounds in a lot of different approaches in its historical process of development. The ancient Greek philosophy mainly focused on the knowledge of nature. When the Sophists and Socrates led it towards the knowledge of man’s perceptual capabilities, metaphysical discussions, more than anything else, turned into epistemological ones. At the same time, following the Orphic tradition, the divine aspect of metaphysics was propounded by philosophers such as Pythagoras, Plato and, to some extent, by Aristotle. This aspect of metaphysical issues was of prime importance to Neo-Platonists.

The Greek tradition of philosophy, that comprises issues such as the philosophy of nature, the philosophy of mind, epistemology and theology, was transferred to Muslims and later on was developed by them. This evolution was such that the issues related to the above-mentioned field were discussed in the books of Muslim philosophers in a scattered way. One of these issues is the issue of epistemology, which has become manifest in subjects such as “philosophical secondary intelligibilia”, “knowledge” “mental existence”, and “the union of the intellect and the intelligible”. Among these subjects, the issue of 'the union of the intellect and the intelligible’, and among the philosophers Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra, hold a special place.

The topic of this article is the 'union of the intellect and the intelligible’. Here, the writer has tried to explore and criticize this issue meticulously from a historical perspective in a way which is somewhat different from the critical studies conducted so far. That is why he has included the words 'from a new perspective’ in the title.

If we wish to determine the place of the issue of the 'union of the intellect and the intelligible’ in the field of philosophical issues through resorting to the new philosophical classification, it is necessary to consider it as one of the discussions related to epistemology. This is because this theory aims at clarifying the nature of man’s knowledge, which is among the most important epistemological problems. One of the significant points of this theory helping us to understand it better is the concept of the intellect or reason. The etymology of this word in philosophy will be of great assistance in grasping its meaning.

A short history of the concept of the intellect ('aql) and the theory of the union of the intellect and the intelligible

What is called 'intellect’ ('aql) in Islamic philosophy is the translation of the Greek word nous. It was Homer who for the first time used this word in a half-technical meaning. He used it in reference to man’s mind and its general functions. However, Anaxagoras used it in a new sense in reference to the expansion of the world. He believed that nous is completely aware of everything,[1] and that there are things in which nous exists.[2] By things he meant existents such as human beings. Of course, before Anaxagoras, Heraclitus had referred to a concept such as Logos which is made of fire and everything comes into existence in conformity with it.[3] Sextus Impericus has explained the quality of the relation between man’s soul to Logos from Heraclitus’s viewpoint. He maintains that according to Heraclitus, man has two aspects: the intellect and the sense. Here the intellect, which is the result of the soul’s absorbing the Logos, is the criterion for the truth. Obviously, these two theories are pretty close to each other.[4]

With Plato’s coming to the scene, nous appeared in the sense of man’s intellectual soul. Plato believes in the existence of three types of soul in man’s nature: vegetable soul, animal soul, and rational soul. The most exalted type of soul, the rational soul (to logistikon) is called nous. In his view, it is the only soul that is immortal.[5] Of course, in his treatise, Timaeus, Plato has utilized the Anaxagorasian application of this word. He holds that nous is rooted in the spirit of the world, which is responsible for our worldly and intellectual activities.[6]

When reading Aristotle’s ideas, we find out that he has used nous in the meaning of intellect, and divided it into 'active’ (nous poietikos) and 'passive’ (nous pathetikos) ones. He believes that it is only the active intellect which is mortal, and that the passive intellect which is based on sense perceptions and memory is immortal and unstable.[7] However, he has also used nous in the sense of the first mover, and holds that the first mover is thoughtful or, better to say, is intelligent. [8]

A study of Stoics’ philosophical approach reveals an evolution in the meaning of nous. They combined the views of Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, Plato and Aristotle, and argued that nous is the same as Logos and has two referents: the cause of the world and man’s intellectual aspect.

With the development of philosophy in Alexandria, and the emergence of a reputable philosopher such as Plotinus, nous found a basic place in Philosophy. Plotinus’s precise thoughts which have been collected by his student, Porphyry, in the book Enneads represent the high importance of nous in his view. He considers God as being The One and beyond the category of existence. Then, relying on the theory of emanation, he explains that the first thing emanated from God is an existent called nous including the universal forms and images of individuals.[9] Thus he conceives of nous as a rational world.[10] Nous emanates the universal soul which is the same soul of the world, and the soul of human beings is emanated from the universal soul. He maintains that the human soul has two parts: the superior part, which belongs to the domain of nous, and the inferior part, which is directly related to the body.

In practice, the approach Plotinus adopts with respect to the first emanation means accepting the union of the intellect (tunon) and the intelligible (tunomnun).[11] The theory of the union of the intellect and the intelligible in the first emanation and other intellects (considering the additions to Plotinus’s theory of emanation by thinkers such as Proclus, who is the most prominent example among all) was extended to man’s intellectual part belonging to the domain of nous by Porphyry. And, in this way, the theory of the union of the intellect and the intelligible entered the field of philosophy to explain the nature of man’s knowledge.

Following the advent of Islam and Muslims’ conquests, the scientific heritage of earlier scholars became accessible to Muslim philosophers and, as a result, the works of Greek philosophers were translated into Arabic.

Among the translated works, those of Aristotle were of prime importance so that those who presented good translations of his works were given huge amounts of money. That might have been the reason why some translators translated other philosophers’ works and then attributed them to Aristotle. One of the books which might have been attributed to Aristotle for this reason is the one translated under the name of Uthulujiya.[12] This book is in fact the translation of a part of Plotinus’s Enneads. This seemingly small mistake exerted a huge impact upon Muslim philosophers’ thoughts. The general acceptance of Aristotle by earlier philosophers on the one hand, and attributing this book to him on the other, were the reasons for Plotinus’s ideas penetrating Islamic philosophy in the name of Aristotle, and Muslim philosophers’ Peripatetic philosophy taking a Neo-Platonic color.

In other words, the Peripatetic philosophy of the Islamic domain was not a merely Aristotelian; rather, it was an Aristotelian philosophy which was greatly influenced by Neo-Platonic philosophy. This influence is manifest in philosophical discussions such as the relation of the one to the many, immortality of the soul, and the union of the intellect and the intelligible.

By the way, earlier translators considered the Arabic word al-'aql (intellect) as the equivalent for the Greek word nous. In this way the word 'intellect’ (al-'aql) was born to Islamic philosophy and, as in Stoics and Plotinus’s philosophies, meant an existent separate from the matter in its essence and acts, and also the rational part of man’s soul. As a result, the discussion of the union of the intellect and the intelligible emerged in Islamic philosophy.

The theory of the union of the intellect and the intelligible in Mulla Sadra and Ibn Sina

Ibn Sina has expressed his disagreements with the theory of the union of the intellect and the intelligible in relation to man’s knowledge of other than himself in several places in his books al-Shifa and al-Isharat wa’l-tanbihat. He says: “I believe that what is said about the union of the intellect and the intelligible is quite absurd and impossible”.[13] He introduces Porphyry as the founder of this theory, and says: “What Porphyry has written about the union of the intellect and the intelligible in Isagoge encourages people to pay attention to this theory. He used to employ figurative and poetic expressions for expressing his ideas in his books on the intellects, the intelligible and the soul. He persuades understanding people to accept these subjects”.[14]

The above expressions reveal Ibn Sina’s attitude to Porphyry and his theory. He shows his opposition in another way as follows:

The theory of the union of the intellect and the intelligible introduced by Porphyry was accepted by a group of philosophers in the past. Stoics have also appreciated Porphyry’s books on the intellect and the intelligible, but all of them are nonsense. Even Porphyry himself cannot understand his own words, and nobody else can, either. Some people have negated what he says, and, in return, Porphyry has also negated them, but the whole thing has been absurd from the very beginning.[15]

Ibn Sina does not suffice to the above statements in contradicting this theory, and goes so far as to presenting some reasons on its irrationality. A careful study of al-Shifa and al-Isharat wa’l-tanbihat reveals that he has adduced four reasons for the negation of the unity of two things. Two of these reasons are general and reject any kind of union between two things,[16] and the other two reject the theory of the union of the intellect and the intelligible, and could be called particular reasons.[17]

The common point among all of Ibn Sina’s reasons for disproving the theory of the union of the intellect and the intelligible goes back to his interpretation of the sentence kawn al-shay’a min al-shay’a (the being of the thing is from the thing) written in the eighth article in al-Shifa. This sentence which is the Arabic translation of one of Aristotle’s sentences in Metaphysics aroused a lot of disagreements among Aristotle’s commentators. In his interpretation of this sentence, Ibn Sina restricts it to two referents: what is called generation and corruption, and what is called accidental entelechy.

In reference to the first case, Ibn Sina points to 'the air’s changing into water’, and in reference to the second case, he points to 'the child’s changing into a man’.[18] Thus it becomes clear that the evolution of things in his view is limited to the change in their forms on the one hand, and in their accidents on the other. Accordingly, he finds the theory of the union of the intellect and the intelligible in contradiction to Aristotle’s ideas, as well as to his own thoughts, which are highly influenced by those of Aristotle. This is because the union propounded in this theory conforms to none of the above-mentioned references.

By refuting the theory of the union of the intellect and the intelligible, Ibn Sina presents his own view of man’s knowledge of intelligibilia. He believes that the soul is rational (possesses intellect), and by intellect he means one of the following:

1. The intellectual faculty through which the soul can perceive;

2. The intelligible forms which dwell in the soul.[19]

Therefore, the essence of the soul is stable all through its life, and its changes are accidental and towards entelechy.

When explaining Ibn Sina’s words in his commentary on al-Isharat wa’l-tanbihat, Fakhr al-Din Razi claims that there are some inconsistencies in Ibn Sina’s thoughts.[20] He maintains that Ibn Sina’s words on rejecting the theory of the union of the intellect and the intelligible contradict his words in his book al-Mabda’ wa’l ma'ad, since while refuting the theory of the union of the intellect and the intelligible in relation to man’s knowledge of intelligibilia in al-Isharat wa’l-tanbihat, he confirms it in al-Mabda’ wa’l ma'ad.[21] This claim of Fakhr al-Din Razi, as Nasir al-Din Tusi has pointed out,[22] is absurd, since at the beginning of al-Mabda’ wa’l ma'ad , Ibn Sina has emphasized that he has written the book on the basis of the Peripatetics’ theories,[23]&[24] while he has presented his own theory in al-Isharat wa’l-tanbihat. Thus there is no contradiction.

Nevertheless, it should be pointed put that Ibn Sina’s rejection of the theory of the union of the intellect and the intelligible is only limited to man’s knowledge of the other, yet he agrees with this theory with respect to God’s knowledge of the other.[25] It might also be possible to extend his acceptance of this theory to the knowledge of absolute immaterial beings or the same immaterial intellects of the other.[26]

As for Mulla Sadra, we see him in complete agreement with the theory of the union of the intellect and the intelligible. He believes that he has received this theory through revelation and inspiration, [27] and that he has apparently been the first to scrutinize it.[28] Of course, the truth is that Mulla Sadra’s main role in this regard has been the expanding of this theory through conducting a lot of research and presenting the necessary arguments for it, [29] because this theory can be found in gnostic books, as well.[30] Some scholars claim that what Mulla Sadra says about this theory is different from what we read in gnostic books; [31] however, if we pay enough attention to the content of these books, we do not see such a difference. [32]

Mulla Sadra’s discussion in this regard consists of two negative and affirmative parts. In his negative discussion, he criticizes Ibn Sina’s reasons on negating the theory of the intellect and the intelligible,[33] and in his affirmative discussion, he presents four reasons for proving this theory.[34] A careful study of Mulla Sadra’s negative and affirmative discussions and the basic principles he formulates for this theory reveals that his disagreement with Ibn Sina on this theory is a fundamental one.

Mulla Sadra believes in trans-substantial motion or, in a more precise sense of the term, existential gradation, while Ibn Sina is against it. The union of the intellect and the intelligible cannot be justified without first accepting existential gradation. It is necessary to say that Mulla Sadra agrees with existential gradation, while Ibn Sina rejects it. Accordingly, it seems that discussions such as 'the meaning of union’ and that 'the union of the intellect and the intelligible is between an unactualized existent and an actualized one’[35], which Mulla Sadra poses as an introduction to his response to Ibn Sina’s reasons, are quite unnecessary.

A critique of the theory of the union of the intellect and the intelligible

It seems that the theory of the union of the intellect and the intelligible in the sense that the existence of the soul obtains gradation or entelechy as a matter of its union with the forms of intelligibilia is not correct. In this critique, the writer has tried to accomplish his task through following an approach different from the one adopted by the opponents of this theory. The fundamental objections raised against this theory are presented below.

First objection

According to the theory of the union of the intellect and the intelligible, at the time of the soul’s knowledge of an intelligible thing, the Giver of forms emanates an intelligible form which is an actualized thing, and then the soul, which is an unactualized existent with the faculty of gaining entelechy, comes to perfection through union with that intelligible form. Evidently, this theory is based on the theory of the intellects, which was introduced in its original form for the first time by Plotinus, and which is based on a particular approach concerning the relation between God and other than Him. Plotinus considers the intellect as the first emanation, the universal soul as the second one, and particular souls as the third one. The evolution of the theory of the intellect after Plotinus was based on the Ptolemaic astronomy, as a result, the theory of the intellects, as well-known among Muslim philosophers, is intertwined with the Ptolemaic astronomy. Shaykh al-Ishraq’s (Suhrawardi) view of this theory is different from that of the Peripatetic philosophers; however, the traces of the Ptolemaic astronomy could obviously be witnessed there, too.[36] Nevertheless, with the rejection of the Ptolemaic astronomy, all the theories associated with it are rejected, too. From among these theories we can refer to the theory of the intellects, and the union of the intellect and the intelligible.

Second objection

One of the ways in which Mulla Sadra improved the theory of the union of the intellect and the intelligible is the extension of this union to sensible, imaginative, and illusive forms. Mulla Sadra believes that in addition to intelligible forms, these forms are also in union with the perceiver at their own level or grade.[37]

However, when trying to bring the theory mentioned above together with his idea stating that perceptual forms are emanated from the external intellect,[38] a big problem arises. How is it possible for the intellect, which is purely immaterial, to emanate sensible, imaginative and illusive forms, which are particular and imperfectly immaterial?

Third objection

It is not possible to justify the existence of errors on the basis of the theory of the union of the intellect and the intelligible. If all perceptual forms are emanated from the Giver of forms, and also if He is the Pure Intellect and Pure Good, man is not allowed to make any errors in his perceptions, which consist of sense data, imaginations, illusions and intelligibilia emanated from the Giver of Forms. Nevertheless, a lot of things that people consider as parts of their knowledge are nothing but double ignorance. It might be said that the theory of the union of the intellect and the intelligible merely expresses the nature of man’s real knowledge and has nothing to say about double ignorance. This cannot be considered a good justification since even in double ignorance the soul acquires an intelligible form; however, this form has no correspondence with the real known, and since any intelligible form is considered as having been emanated from the external intellect, the problem shows face again. If this theory was limited to intelligibilia, there might have been a way to solve the problem; whereas as long as the domain of the union includes even the sensibles, the problem cannot be easily removed.

Fourth objection

Nowadays, most of man’s knowledge consists of mentally-posited quiddities such as house, factory, car, office and market. What is evident in the theory of the intellects is that the Giver of forms is the emanating agent of the forms of natural existents, so that under the influence of the spheres, the three generables result from the four elements, and each has its particular and natural species. Therefore, the theory of the union of the intellect and the intelligible, which becomes meaningful alongside the theory of the intellects, will be the reason why most of man’s knowledge has remained unexplained, and this is a proper sign indicating the inefficiency and falsity of this theory.

Fifth objection

This theory has completely ignored the fact that perception has certain aspects. It maintains that there is only one sensible form for each external object with which the soul unites when it obtains its knowledge. This is also true about imaginative, illusive and intelligible forms. This happens while an external object could be perceived from different aspects. Thus if this theory is correct, it would be necessary for the Giver of forms to emanate as many sensible forms as the number of individuals’ perceptual aspects of an intelligible object, and this is what the advocates of this theory disagree with. This is also true about intelligible forms. Paying attention to the definitions provided by different people from the same rational concept and their disagreements about it indicates that people have different views of the same concept. This is true while the advocates of this theory believe that the intelligible form is not more than only one form. They might also maintain that the conceptual disagreements concerning the intellect are due to conceiving the concept that is present before the intellect as being rational, while an individual might mistake an imaginative or sensible concept with a rational one. This response is correct only when the union of the intellect and the intelligible is limited to rational concepts. However, if we believe that the union includes all perceptive forms, the given response will extend the objection to other levels of perception such as the sense, imagination or illusion, without providing a convincing answer.

Sixth objection

This theory cannot explain man’s knowledge of propositions and is only limited to his knowledge of concepts. The Giver of forms in this theory plays the role of the emanator of perceptual forms; however, concerning the knowledge of propositions, which constitute the most important part of each individual’s knowledge, no justification could be provided. The fact that this theory does not include the propositions is due to their expressing the relations among concepts rather than concepts themselves. One might say that the theory of the union of the intellect and the intelligible has no claim as to justifying man’s knowledge of propositions; therefore, no problem will arise here. Nevertheless, if we believe that concepts do not reveal their real selves unless in the context of a proposition[39] so that an intelligible, imaginative or sensible thing is emanated, the objection will be to some extent serious. In this case, however, the discussion will be a fundamental one, because one might say that a proposition consists of certain words expressing a judgment, and each judgment is a simple issue comprising a part of man’s knowledge, thus it can be emanated from the active intellect. Such a viewpoint involves us in its own particular problems, in the sense that it leads us to the domain of the disputes related to infinity. An infinite number of potential judgments are realized in the world and for each of them a negative proposition can be hypothesized. Considering the explanation given above, the emanation of such forms from the active intellect asks for some hesitation.

Seventh objection

One of the fundamental objections to the theory of the union of the intellect and the intelligible pertains to the theory of trans-substantial motion. It seems that the acceptance of this theory sacrifices the identity of a man’s soul in the course of time. As the matter is always in a process of change, Muslim philosophers consider the soul as the criterion for man’s identity. This view can be found in philosophers’ discussions of resurrection.[40] Now, if, following the Peripatetics, we consider the essence of the soul rather than its accidents as being in change, there will not remain a stable thing to preserve the identity of the individual’s entity over time. This is because in Mulla Sadra’s view, each existent has a particular limit and quiddity for itself. In this theory accidents do not play a specific role; rather, they are derived from the essence, and are among its concomitants. Therefore, the gradation of a soul promotes it to a higher existential level from which another existential limit is abstracted. This is a limit different from the abstracted limit of its previous level. If we consider quiddity as a purely mentally-posited thing, this problem will not threaten the theory of the union of the intellect and the intelligible; however, for Mulla Sadra quiddity is an abstract thing and a philosophical secondary intelligible possessing an external source of abstraction, and its own particular principles.

Conclusion

Perhaps one of Mulla Sadra’s reasons for presenting and confirming the theory of the union of the intellect and the intelligible is revealing the relation between man’s knowledge and the emanating source of Divine knowledge. The negation of this theory does not mean the negation of such a relation; rather, it is the negation of particular bases employed for explaining the quality of this relation. In order to refer to this relation, we can resort to some basic issues other than 'accepting the matter and form’, 'the unitary feature of their combination’, 'the theory of emanation’, 'the theory of the intellect’, and the like. Nevertheless, if like Mulla Sadra, we consider the knowledge of the essence of existence as being impossible, it will be impossible to speak of the quality of any kind of existence, including man’s knowledge, which Mulla Sadra believes to be of the type of existence. His basic philosophical principles necessitate the restriction of man’s knowledge to the concomitants of existence, rather than its essence. This problem blocks the discussion of many philosophical issues including the nature, causality, the relation between God and the world, and the nature of man’s knowledge of the world. Therefore, it seems that by inquiring into such issues, Mulla Sadra has acted against his own basic principles, and this is not permissible for a philosopher to whom paying attention to the consistency of his ideas and theories should be of prime importance.

 

 

Notes